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Security Framework for Industrial Collaborative Robotic Cyber-
Physical Systems  
Abstract   The paper introduces a security framework for the application of human-robot collaboration in 
a futuristic industrial cyber-physical system (CPS) context of industry 4.0. The basic elements and 
functional requirements of a secure collaborative robotic cyber-physical system are explained and then 
the cyber-attack modes are discussed in the context of collaborative CPS whereas a defense mechanism 
strategy is proposed for such a complex system. The cyber-attacks are categorized according to the extent 
on controllability and the possible effects on the performance and efficiency of such CPS. The paper also 
describes the severity and categorization of such cyber-attacks and the causal effect on the human worker 
safety during human-robot collaboration. Attacks in three dimensions of availability, authentication and 
confidentiality are proposed as the basis of a consolidated mitigation plan. We propose a security 
framework based on a two-pronged strategy where the impact of this methodology is demonstrated on a 
teleoperation benchmark (NeCS-Car). The mitigation strategy includes enhanced data security at 
important interconnected adaptor nodes and development of an intelligent module that employs a 
concept similar to system health monitoring and reconfiguration.  
Keywords   Cyber Physical System, Cyber Security, Human-Robot Collaboration  
1. Introduction 
Future industrial manufacturing systems are most likely based on the cyber-physical production systems 
(CPPS) to produce smart products with larger flexibility [1-3]. This intelligent manufacturing concept 
evolved from the collaborative cyber-physical system (CCPS) definition in which integration of physical 
and computational components result in sensing and control of state variation in real world parameters 
[4, 5]. Such a system is comprised of the physical hardware, sensor network as well as information, 
computer and communication technologies with human machine interface (HMI). These infrastructures 
provide technological challenges and foster new interaction opportunities for humans with equipment, 
machines and tools in the environment. CPS integrates computation and physical processes to optimize 
resource usage and system performance. These systems can be connected to the internet or an external 
secure network [6]. The physical hardware can be a robot, actuators or a manufacturing plant and can be 
termed as the physical component (PC) in the CPS. The cost of the physical component can be very high 
and varies from one application area to the other [7].  
For smooth functioning of such collaborative robotic system, a secure CPS is required in order to protect 
highly sophisticated and costly physical elements [8]. The security of such systems can be compromised 
by cyber-attacks through the network or internet connectivity [9]. It is certain that such attacks enter the 
CPS through the cyber component (CC) and hit the PC (Industrial computer, PLC, robot etc.) which is 
mainly controlled by the CC. The increased connectivity to external networks is a threat to the security of 
CPS [10]. If attackers develop means to enter the control systems and modify the system behavior, this 
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may cause irreversible damage to the PC. Cyber attacks on IT systems has resulted in the evolution of 
anti-virus shields for the security of computer networks [11, 12]. The CPS domain is different in this 
context as the security of an IT system only serves the CC and there is no mechanism in it to protect PC. 
Moreover, the causal effect of cyber-attacks from cyber layer all the way to the PC is inherent. In this 
context, development of mitigation plans against such intelligent cyber-attacks is a novel area of research. 
It involves identification of novel frameworks for analyzing the cyber-attacks on CPS [13-15].  
The most important aspect regarding the security of a CPS is the design knowledge of a cyber-attack. The 
critical aspect of an effective mitigation plan for the security of CPS is to know the structure of such a 
cyber-attack. To study this, a number of cyber-attacks were designed against CPS components, and its 
effects on cyber, physical and collaborative control components were evaluated. Stuxnet [16]  and Aurora 
attack [17], have created awareness and widespread concerns about physical infrastructure damage 
through cyber-attacks. As stated, existing security measures were mostly developed for cyber-only 
systems and they cannot be effectively applied to CPS in a collaborative network directly. Therefore, new 
approaches to prevent CPS failure are necessary. The difference in the properties of physical and cyber 
layers within CPS has made the interface a very important node where cyber components render a large 
variety of attacks possible. In contrast to that, the PC are inflexible and simple with relatively low 
possibilities of attacks.  
Security features in networks [18] are essential for the protection of key infrastructure. For today’s 
industrial control systems, new intelligent network architectures [19] are an essential requirement. The 
present research aims to develop an industrial security framework for safe and secure human-robot 
collaboration (HRC) in an industrial connected manufacturing environment [20], known as ‘Collaborative 
Robotic Cyber-Physical System’ (CRCPS) [21]. There is an increasing interest in industrial customers of 
‘collaborative robot manufacturers’ dealing with automatic and semi-automatic assembly processes in 
leveraging their assembly processes to a stage to enable seamless human-robot-collaboration. This is 
particularly valid for semi-automatic processes in the automotive industry which are characterized by the 
fact that some tasks are done manually by the human worker. The security of network in the industrial 
‘Collaborative Robotic Cyber-Physical System’ (CRCPS) is crucial as this system is aimed to avoid any 
critical life threatening situation for the worker working with the heavy payload industrial collaborative 
robots. In addition to worker safety, it is imperative that important information within CRCPS remain 
secure and must not be compromised due to a malicious attack [22]. The secure CPS must have the ability 
to determine the accountability of human workers while maintaining their safety and privacy. The 
problem becomes complex due to the increasing interactions in the modules of CPS and also due to the 
increasing complexity of the design of cyber-attacks. Raya et al. [15] classified cyber-attacks based on 
three dimensions. These attributes are related to the type of attacker as insider or outsider to the system, 
attacker’s aims and objectives and the attack mode with which the attack is launched. An active mode 
attacker attempts to disturb the CPS node availability and authentication and directs the attack towards 
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physical damage, whereas passive mode attack retains itself in the network to extract valuable system 
level and control information like a reconnaissance mission [23]. By avoiding information from untrusted 
senders and by constructing a trust network, the secure CPS network can reduce the threat. The 
untrusted sender can be a sensor already under cyber-attack that is sending misleading information.   
This research paper focuses on the CPS components and the interfaces connecting different components 
specifically at the interactive nodes of physical and cyber components. The architecture is developed on a 
module based defense strategy framework and by securing the interfaces. In this paper, we are proposing 
a systematic solution of intelligent secure physical modules to prevent cyber-tempted physical 
destruction even when the cyber layer is compromised. In this context, self- secured intelligent adaptors 
are employed between physical and cyber components that preserve the prevailing reliability in control 
and data flow. A decentralized architecture approach is adopted for the CRCPS structure so that the 
system may not have a single node of failure that an attacker can mark. However, against such 
architecture, the foe attacks sub-systems, and the security model design has to include the 
interdependent interactions between modules. 
In this paper, section 2 introduces the CRCPS technological components and a CPS structure. The CPS 
structure further supports the development of a novel framework to safeguard CRCPS against (incoming 
intelligent) cyber-attacks. Section 3 deals with the concepts of cyber-attack on CPS, the differences of 
cyber-attack mechanism on an IT system, CPS in general and a special case of CRCPS. Section 4 discusses 
the attack properties in different layers and a categorization of attacks in the context of possible effects 
on CRCPS is explained. Section 5 reveals the mitigation plan of the proposed framework for a secure 
CRCPS and a safeguard against the physical objectives of an intelligent cyber-attack. Section 6 
demonstrates a teleoperation benchmark to show the effectiveness of the strategy by simulating a 
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack on the NeCS-Car communication network. Section 7 concludes 
the paper by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed strategy.     
2. Collaborative Robotic CPS 
The HRC for a given industrial scenario is suggested by exhibiting safe interaction without any fencing. 
This application area in CPS research is a perfect example where safety and security, are integrated and 
need to be addressed in the CPS architecture [24]. The merger of security and safety issues in the CRCPS 
design is similar to the concept followed in the design and risk assessment of industrial facility and control 
that reflect both facets [14]. Security is closely associated with safety as both of these characteristics have 
to be addressed synchronously. The safety aspect tangibly guards industrial workers against the machines 
whereas security shields the systems from persons as foes.  
Based on such integrated approach, technology selection for such a system can have multiple challenges. 
As an example of HRC, a speed or separation monitoring collaborative system is illustrated in fig. 1. The 
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concept employs several networked integrated sensors and the HRC is taking place in the area under 
monitoring for accomplishing an industrial task. In the collaboration type of speed and separation 
monitoring, the system incorporates cameras or other sensors for the real-time worker positioning. 
Moreover, robot speed is reduced or a probable break is applied in the case, the operator move in the 
hazardous area. The overhead cameras are installed to track the real-time human position with the help 
of markers. A laser scanner or a light curtain can be installed to cover any violation of monitored area and 
to signal the robot for human presence. Additionally, there is another system for human location 
signature acquisition through the inertial sensors. The operator has to wear a vest (or a body suit) during 
collaboration that comprises of several IMU built-in at different body positions, so providing rate and 
position data to the CRCPS. Gyro sensor data is communicated through a safe protocol to the physical and 
cyber components for further real-time analysis and decisions made are then rerouted into the system. 
The IMU fitted helmet for head position and rate data is another device used for a similar purpose.  
 
Fig. 1  HRC, technology modules 
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Fig. 2  CRCPS structure: Modules, components, adaptor technology modules and interconnected links. 
As the basic aim for the development of CRCPS is to maintain worker safety while HRC is in operation, we 
assume a safe HRC system is in place. Detailed safe HRC system requirements, CPS structure, safety 
classifications, industrial scenarios and development methodology are studied for CRCPS in [10, 25]. Here, 
we focus on security aspects of CRCPS and the protection measures needed for implementation. In 
CRCPS, the functional modules are interconnected through wired systems and/or wirelessly to converse 
with the same type of devices [26, 27]. Using human-machine interactive (HMI) systems, machines 
connect and cooperate with humans through a network. Hence, the disposition of a complete CPS 
interprets the human collaborator as a vital system component. In defining CRCPS, there are a few main 
interconnected components in the model (See Fig. 2). These modules are the human component (HC), the 
physical component (PC) and the computational component (CC) [28]. The communication midst the 
three entities is subjected to the advent of the enabling adaptor technologies in CPS. To define a CRCPS, 
the basic modules of HC, PC, and CC interact through adaptors while the system possesses all the inherent 
characteristics of CPS like integrity, sociability, locality, irreversibility, adaptability, autonomous and highly 
automated [10, 28]. For CRCPS, the PC must be a robot. The human component is coupled through 
diverse adaptor technologies, e.g., worker position tracking is crucial adaptor in the CRCPS either through 
overhead cameras or IMU. The CRCPS is an automated system as it eliminates the limits amid the multiple 
components, thus favoring their operating communications. 
There are numerous HMI technologies that are dependent on acoustics, vision, and haptics. The planned 
CRCPS has employed vision system for detection and tracking of operator position. The collaborative 
robot command system can also use gesture recognition of operator and acoustics like voice control. 
Furthermore, a diversity of actuators and sensors can deliver the communication among PC, HC and CC.  
There are regular connections revealed amid the components contributing a role. Adaptor 
6 
 
technologies are situation dependent (plug and play) devices. There are discretionary situation 
reliant connections among the adaptors and regular components in CRCPS. In CRCPS, the controller 
node of the PC (robot system) performs the intelligent control part to compute precise positioning and 
rate commands. PROFINET/ProfiSafe in real time protocol provides up to 1 ms cycle time for PROFINET IO 
applications cascading real-time communication concept for distributed component models. It is used in 
CRCPS and the communication system is designed through wireless or wired networking and information. 
This specific application is analogous to such instrumentation in which sensor measurements to a 
supervisor application are communicated through a network that renders the important information like 
safety distance calculation in real time.  
The system communication requirement aims to present machine to machine (M2M) and human to 
machine (H2M) communication integration. Mostly, the information runs from a machine (sensor or a 
physical module) connected through a network and then arrives at a system using a gateway where it can 
be looked over and proceeded on. The H2M communication in CRCPS initiates through gyro output and 
sent over the network so that it can be analyzed for the safe distance computation and other 
considerations. The selection of an appropriate protocol is determined by the secure communication, 
range and data rate. ZigBee or wireless HART-based 802.15.4 protocol is normally selected for the 
moderate range. A time division protocol is exploited for real time communication in wireless HART as it 
practices channel blacklisting for interference avoidance. Due to the service quality, certain 
communicating nodes are employed as a preferred choice for time/resource allocation. However, 
Bluetooth protocol is suitable in CRCPS due to close area proximity communication with high security.  
3. Challenges of Cyber Security for CRCPS 
A secure CRCPS framework can only be constructed if there is an awareness about the intelligent 
knowledge driven (of the target) cyber-attacks. The cyber-attack can come from both internal and 
external sources. Raya et al. [15] have described an attacker according to three ways of classification, i.e., 
active vs. passive, malicious vs. rational and outsider vs. insider. As shown in Fig. 3, a cyber-attack may 
arrive from an external source like outside communication channels, wireless transmission or from an 
internal attacker by physically accessing a data port, e.g., by a worker involved in HRC in a given industrial 
scenario. The active attacker initiates the attack directly while passive attacker has the tendency to 
observe/eavesdrop from the control or cyber component of the target CPS [29]. The passive attacker’s 
function is to do reconnaissance about the target’s physical asset through the control or cyber layer and 
bring back the valuable information to aid in the design of an intelligent active cyber-attack. An active 
attacker uses the network authority, but bounded by its inherent intelligence, can only significantly harm 
the target’s physical assets, if well-equipped with the required knowledge. A malicious attacker aims for 
destruction at a larger scale while rational attacker specifies the target. Here, the job of the CRCPS 
mitigation security framework is to stop all classes of attackers.      
7 
 
 
Fig. 3  Cyber-attack routes in CRCPS and logical causal effect diagram for HRC. 
A security concept in an IT system is different from the one in CPS, mainly due to the fact that a PC is 
integrated and controlled by a CC in CPS. In the CPS scenario, it is a necessary requirement to safeguard 
PC, even in the case of a security compromised CC. If in the CRCPS case, the cyber component is 
compromised by a cyber-attack, the PC comprised of the robot, human, actuators, and sensors may come 
under direct attack and may result in a system failure like unsafe HRC or occurrence of an accident while 
HRC in operation in any given industrial scenario. 
To design a security concept in CPS effectively, it is advantageous to analyze how cyber-attacks work in 
such a system. Fig. 4 introduces the conceptual difference of a cyber-attack mechanism on a CPS, an IT 
system and an anthropocentric CPS (ACPS). ACPS is an extension of a CPS in the social domain [13, 21, 28, 
30, 31], in which human is an integrated part of the CPS. The CRCPS structure shown in Fig. 2 is a logical 
derivative of the ACPS.  
In an IT system, all the phases of a cyber-attack, i.e., from planning to meeting final objective are 
conducted in a cyber-layer. However, in a CPS, these tasks are divided according to the role played by 
each layer. For example, the attack planning phase is comprised of all layers to gather the information of 
the target system [32]. Here, the reconnaissance part of the cyber-attack is conducted as a passive 
attacker to aid in designing a sophisticated attack for an active attacker. In the next phase, a cyber-attack 
weapon prepares itself in order to gain control of the target system and achieve the final objective. The 
delivery phase is only possible through the cyber layer and the attack execution is to overcome the 
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control part of the target system using the obtained information from the passive attacks. Though, the 
objective of a cyber-attack in an industrial CPS is to destroy costly physical assets, the cyber and control 
components can also be part of objective depending upon the target system application and control 
structure. In an ACPS case, the additional role of the human in the cyber-attack mechanism is at three 
places, i.e., in the planning phase for the system information, in the delivery phase of the attack 
through USB port or other inside ways and also the human can be a final objective to be harmed in a 
CRCPS. Therefore, it is evident that a cyber-attack mechanism for an IT system, CPS, and an ACPS has 
different means and concepts. Similarly, a mitigation plan against such sophisticated attacks should 
also follow a different approach.   
 
Fig. 4  Cyber-attack mechanism: A comparison of ACPS, CPS and an IT system 
4. Cyber-attacks categorization criteria in CRCPS 
In order to cater for a variety of cyber-attacks, it is important to see the node characteristics in the 
network. Once the attack enters the CRCPS through the cyber layer, it can conduct a variety of attacks like 
broken nodes or data falsification. The horizon of such attacks may span from cyber to control layer to 
perturb the physical objective. A decentralized CPS architecture is preferred as compared to a failure at 
the unique node that a foe can aim. The execution phase attacking the target’s control action attempts to 
achieve specific properties guided by operational requirements and the cyber layer properties 
(confidentiality, integrity, and availability) must be secured in the face of cyber-attack. Overall, it is the 
goal of cyber-attack that determines the extent gained of the particular properties of different CPS 
components. The goal may range from the degraded performance of some aspects of the physical 
operation of CPS up to the complete disruption or destruction of PC in a CPS. Figure 5 shows the guideline 
list of attack methods and the interconnections of possible targets and effects in different CPS layers. In 
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line with excessive interdependencies among CPS functional components and adaptors, secondary effects 
can follow during individual element interactions which needs to be confronted. These second order 
effects can occur at components engaged in different layers or even involving other (cyber or physical) 
domains. 
 
Fig. 5  The methods of cyber-attacks guideline: an interconnectivity of targets and involved CPS layers [33] 
The execution phase of cyber-attack effects the control and cyber components as shown in Fig. 4. The 
possible effects and the extent of the attack on controllability of CPS should be assessed [1, 11]. It is 
important to categorize and assess the impact of the particular type of attacks in the context of CRCPS. 
The control component’s properties are controllability and observability of internal states of the system 
[32-34]. A control algorithm for a controllable system is designed to render a stable system. An observable 
system employs a state estimator or an observer that for given sensor measurements, can track the 
system state precisely [9]. In CRCPS, sensors for human position information are an example of 
observability. The two properties are mathematical duals. Any compromise on system controllability or 
internal control variables can effect on CRCPS physical outcome in terms of system stability and efficiency. 
The scale (from low to serious attack) is developed according to the CRCPS physical outcome. Based on 
the three categories of cyber-attack, (authentication, availability, and confidentiality) the possible effects 
may range from low to high. Low to medium range effects mean short period control loss to reduced 
sensor efficiency, while high risk is gauged by the false sensor output under attack [9]. As an example, if 
the worker safety is disturbed due to the false sensor output, the extent gained by the attacker crosses 
the line from partial to full attack. The proposed framework is designed keeping in mind that the attacker 
has a strong understanding of the system stability, efficiency, safety and resource constraints. 
Table 1 shows criteria based assessment on cyber-attack effect on CRCPS physical outcome. Low to 
serious cyber-attacks are categorized and assessed based on the degradable cyber properties of the 
CRCPS, i.e., node authentication, node availability, data confidentiality, and integrity. The level of attacks 
on CRCPS is considered low if the control is lost for a short period. In table 1, the low category 
authentication attacks include tempering, position faking and message suppression in a close area 
network [35]. These are forms of false authentication techniques an attacker can follow to disturb the 
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system. Sensor node authentication is measured as a vital security prerequisite in networks and the most 
involved system component is, in fact, the network user. A CRCPS operator may act as a malicious 
attacker or an eavesdropper by violating security as a legitimate network user.  
Table 1 Assessment & categorization of cyber-attacks on CRCPS 
 
 
The availability attacks in the same category describe many attacks pertaining to node non-availability. 
The node availability condition infers that information traffic through all nodes in a network at any time is 
possible. Attacks on availability disturb the performance features of threads and processes, such as 
memory access delays, data transfer features of buses and troublesome communication. Grey hole and 
sinkhole attacks are a type of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in which packets drop and fake routing 
update are possible and can cause launch of other attacks. Broadcast tempering is another type of attack 
that may lead to the accident by hiding safety related messages from legitimate nodes [11]. To design a 
protected CPS network, authentication, data integrity, privacy, confidentiality, and availability are 
important. Out of these parameters, authentication, availability, and confidentiality are relevant to 
CRCPS, mainly due to the safety application of the human worker [24]. A confidentiality attack allows the 
foe to collect system information and use such information when the user is not aware of the information 
leak. A repudiation attack occurs when a system does not implement controls to correctly monitor user 
activities, therefore, compromising industrial data protection and worker anonymity in the case of CRCPS. 
The medium risk for CRCPS is defined due to decreased sensor efficiency. The medium risk authentication 
attacks include Sybil attack [36, 37], masquerading and also the type of attacks in which cheating with 
positioning information and ID disclosure are common. The CPS system must be able to identify the 
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untrusted sender and ignore signals from such sensors within the CPS. The availability attacks in the 
medium category include the black hole, worm hole, DoS, and Jamming attacks [38]. Black holes are 
formed in interconnected nodes due to a broken node. In the CRCPS network, a broken node from an 
important sensor, e.g., laser scanner responsible for area monitoring, can cause the collaborative system 
to be less efficient. All of these attacks are categorized as having low to medium scale effects on cyber 
security of CRCPS [39].  
An attack on the CRCPS is considered serious when the sensor data is false. By influencing sensor output, 
the state estimates can be corrupted by an attacker that cause wrong control signals to actuators. A 
replay attack [40, 41] is like sending previously received information in the network again, leading to a 
failure to signal propagation. A false functioning of such sensors in the network may jeopardize the 
system safety. In CRCPS, the worker’s location information is coming either from vision system or from 
the motion sensors. A replay attack, i.e., false information update about the worker location, can make 
the system unsafe. Another goal is to acquire information about the control algorithms, sensors and 
actuators and how they are used to monitor and control the CPS. An attack on confidentiality can 
compromise the system state information that is necessary for a cyber-attack to perturb the PC of the 
CPS. Eavesdropping [18] deals with the illegitimate collection of messages by the attacker and enhance 
the attacker's ability to influence the physical operations of the system.  
 
Fig. 6    Collaborative Human-Robot CPS under Cyber-attack and the two-pronged strategy as a mitigation plan 
CRCPS is comprised of a (vital) sensor network which keeps the HC safe. The network must not be 
compromised because of the associated physical outcomes of stability, efficiency, and safety. The security 
of the cyber layer comprised of attacks based on integrity, availability, and confidentiality that can effect 
adversely on access, performance and other qualities of the CRCPS. The quantification of risk methods in 
CPS is studied [42] about integrity, availability, and confidentiality. In response to an attack, challenges 
and influence on the security principles of confidentiality and integrity are identified. Detection of high-
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risk nodes in a network can be identified effectively by a security framework to sort appropriate 
responses with the fundamental principles of security. Effective categorization of cyber-attacks in the 
context of CRCPS revealed the possibility of risk according to the extent of the attack on controllability. As 
system stability disturbance for a short period is linked with the low level of attacks, reduced system 
efficiency can be caused by the attacks categorized at the medium level in CRCPS. This is based on the 
assumption that the human avoidance algorithm and safety distance computations in CRCPS cannot be 
disturbed in real time. The serious types of attacks are considered by which HRC safety become 
compromised. 
5. Proposed Secure Framework for CRCPS 
Communication channel security is fundamental for the deployment of the safe network. Providing 
authenticity in a short distance CPS network involves protecting legitimate nodes from attackers 
penetrating the network through fabricated identity. For CRCPS application, the trustworthy secure data 
update is required especially for the interface adaptor nodes between CC and PC in real time and with a 
limited overhead. The idea is to develop a security framework (See Fig. 6) by evolving a two-pronged 
defense strategy. The strategy allows developing secure adaptors through strict cyber security procedures 
comprising of authentication, availability and confidentiality requirements by choosing proper nodes for 
solution implementation. The second component of the strategy has an independent intelligent module 
that may provide calibration support and comparison in real time from the reference library of sensors 
and actuators stored elsewhere in the system.  
In the event of a cyber-attack on a CPS designed for HRC, the effects of cyber perturbations reach 
ultimately to the human working with the robot. It is required to make a mitigation plan based on a 
protective architecture that can support the CPS under attack. To build a secure CRCPS, we are proposing 
a two-pronged strategy in which the first part will take care of the interconnected nodes and the 
enhanced data security at important adaptor nodes. The node authentication and data integrity check 
procedures are adopted for all the adaptor nodes between the CC and other components such that in the 
case of a compromised CC, the remaining CPS can be secured and take decision for its survival. The 
second part of the strategy is to develop an intelligent module to see the health check of the costly PC and 
reporting it to the main control room in the industrial scenario, for making decisions on further options if 
a compromised CC is detected. 
In cyber security schemes, the concept of physical status checks reflects information from the physical 
execution, rather than theoretical flaws in the algorithm. This concept can be used for a preventive 
security strategy based on physical parameter checks to identify whether the system is under attack. The 
original concept is to cater against ‘side channel attacks’ [43, 44]. Some examples are timing information, 
power consumption or electromagnetic leaks. Moreover, heat dissipation measurement from a chip and 
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acoustic signals can be exploited for target system disruption. Based on such information, side-channel 
attacks are developed based on statistical tools [40]. In the CRCPS security strategy, the side channel 
attack theory is used to conceptualize the physical parameter measurement at key nodes, devices, and PC 
which can diagnose the system under attack [45].  
The proposed security framework is based on the assumption that a cyber-shield installed at CC acts as a 
standard IT system security protection that will comprehend the cyber-attack. A designed cyber-attack for 
CPS can arrive only through CC, but actually, perturb the control layer to cause damage to PC. So, this is a 
pre-assumption that CC and any further secure modules in the CRCPS having similar shields can also be 
compromised. An incoming cyber-attack has the possibility to effect the important basic functionality of 
the CPS if the layers after CC come under control by the attack. A redundant control system to run such 
basic system functionalities of PC can be proposed in the event of CC under attack, but its switching 
mechanism is hard to conceive. Again, an independent, intelligent module is required to find out the 
system status in real time. One such technique would be the comparison of real-time physical parameters 
of sensors with the pre-stored specifications information. There must also be an option in the case of 
CRCPS to come to a manual industrial scenario if the independent module (IM) reports of a less efficient 
system due to an attack. On the physical aspect, the collaborative system is designed for safe and secure 
working of humans near functional industrial robots. The goal of a possible cyber-attack on such a system 
is to break the system security, get the control of a possible sensor and actuator nodes, corrupt the data 
and then disturb the CRCPS functionality. A cyber-attack scenario on CRCPS is shown in figure 5 and the 
possible ways and means to infiltrate into the system are discussed. Additionally, the defense strategy 
framework is highlighted in the face of a cyber-attack. 
As shown in Figure 6, node authentication and data integrity check procedures are installed at the 
adaptor nodes adjacent to CC in order to avoid the spread of cyber-attack beyond CC and to safeguard the 
costly PC. The node authentication checks include the handshaking procedure followed by the security 
key parameters identification and then generation, exchange and verification of a security certificate. An 
encryption algorithm can also be proposed especially for the nodes where confidentiality is required, e.g., 
system health report generated by the IM needs a confidential path to the HC or to any centralized place 
for human notice and further intervention. The routing for the IM can be checked for man-in-the-middle 
(MiM) type of attack. In MiM attack, the attacker modifies the communication among parties who trust 
the channel for communication with each other. Active eavesdropping is an example of MiM attack in 
which the attacker develops self-directed connections with the targets. The attacker transmits signals 
among the parties and the whole exchange is organized by the attacker. A similar MiM check can be 
introduced for the nodes between CC and PC. The IM is proposed as a strategy to find out the CRCPS 
health and efficiency under a cyber-attack. The IM consists of a system comparator to compare the real-
time sensors and actuators parameters with the pre-stored specifications library. Any reduction in the 
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efficiency of PC can be monitored by IM and report directly to a central control for human intervention for 
further decision making.    
However, there exists a fundamental issue to be unsolved about the cause of such unusual behavior in 
physical parameters or in readings of IM. The reasons can be identified in two ways. One may be due to 
the cyber-attack and the other may be due to the erroneous behavior of the sensor, chip or a machine 
due to some malfunction. The important point is to differentiate between the system under cyber-attack 
versus the erroneous behavior of the system. There are protocol verification methods in which both 
hardware and software verification is conducted through system simulation in advance of the system 
operation. However, to ensure system reliability during operation, the machines must be enabled to do 
the verification process on their own. Self-verifying or self-learning machines may also make use of the 
adjustment algorithms to cater for the aging of the physical systems, may look for the intentional and 
unintentional faults and better predict and alarm in an accurate way against cyber-attacks.  
There are self-verification approaches like building multi-compartment [46, 47] or container modules [48]. 
Such methods can be valuable in tackling with strange system performance within modules and to search 
for the real source of the malfunction. For example, the container approach is a system integration 
strategy that takes the individual modules and components from different unverified and potentially 
malicious sources and constructs a safe and correct overall system. The container approach encapsulates 
intellectual property (IP) blocks in verifiable modules. Every IP component is placed inside a container, 
which actually implements the required protection mechanisms. Every container has multiple layers of 
verification arrangements and protection checks that depend on the acceptable overhead. The 
integration of such containers ensures the surrounding system to work securely. 
6. Benchmark Setup for demonstration of CRCPS 
We aim to discuss a scenario where we can simulate the proposed scheme on a real time system. Since, 
the full-scale implementation of a highly precise, multi-DOF robotic platform is under development, we 
have demonstrated a simplified version of the proposed algorithm on a network is driven teleoperation 
setup. As mentioned above, the proposed security framework is a two-step methodology based on the 
enhanced data security for interconnected nodes and an intelligent system health monitor for real-time 
mitigation of cyber-attacks.  
A teleoperation setup for drive by the wireless application is considered as a generalized CRCPS for 
simulation of the proposed strategy. Such systems are very popular in applications involving operation in 
dirty, dangerous and difficult to access places [49, 50]. For long range teleoperation, wireless networks 
are preferable; however, control over a wireless network presents some challenges due to inherent 
communication link issues [48]. The classical configuration of Master/Slave parts is retained in our demo 
while improving the position control algorithm for real-time implementation. A fuzzy controller is used to 
accommodate the degrading quality of service (QoS) of the control and video flows by varying the packet 
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rate of the video frame. Moreover, the adaptive scheme implemented on this test bench permits to 
improve the telepresence even in the presence of delays and packet losses up to an acceptable level 
based on the subjective quality of service. The proposed scheme is successfully incorporated on a 
benchmark setup where the passivity-based controller with adaptive neuro-fuzzy monitoring loop for QoS 
control is implemented. 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 7 Drive by Wireless – (a) Driver at remote station using stereo vision (b) Teleoperation test bench Vehicle 
 
A drive-by-wireless system is a collaborative CPS in which the mechanical linkages and transmissions are 
replaced by electronic systems and electrical wires. Multisensory data is passed to a data acquisition and 
computational platform, which transfer the electrical energy into mechanical motion. There are different 
types of drive-by-wire systems, so more generally, it is referred to as ‘x-by-wire’ [51]. This paper describes 
a drive-by wireless teleoperation application in which the test vehicle is designed to be remotely 
teleoperated from an active steering wheel platform (Mater station) which is equipped with a 3D stereo 
vision system as shown in Fig. 7. Bilateral teleoperation is performed using wheel contact torque 
measurements and feedback for force deflection; whereas, the wireless connection allows to test coding 
algorithms in the presence of packet loss and transmission delays. 
The scattering based transformation is supplemented with a packet loss strategy by an observer to choose 
between the hold last sample (HLS) and zeroing. The gain of position control loop is time-varying with 
respect to delay while ensuring the passivity-based stability condition [52]. The system block level 
diagram is shown in Fig. 8, where the nominal teleoperation loop is supplemented by a feedback loop 
which keeps a track of network performance for the control of QoS [53]. 
 
Fig. 8 Teleoperation architecture with Master/Slave stations and intelligent module (IM) 
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Requirements and Challenges: The position control loop of the master/slave tracks the position and force 
commands as shown in Fig. 8. In [54], a detailed survey of techniques in bilateral teleoperation is 
presented. The single degree of freedom (DOF) master/slave dynamics with position control loop in 
standard notation are given as:  
 
 
 
Where, xm is the velocity of the steering command at the master station; Fh and Fm establish the force pair 
applied to the motors at the master/slave; Mm, Ms are the inertias; Bm, Bs1 are the viscous frictions of 
master and slave; Fh, Fe are the reaction couple from the operator and the environment; while the xm, xs 
are the respective positions. Ffeed = K(xm(t-τ)-xs) and Fback = K(xs(t-τ)-xm) are the position controllers for 
the slave and master stations respectively. Instead of transmitting original force and velocity variables, the 
scattering transformation based passivity control algorithm is used under the assumption of a constant 
time delay (τ). Following transformation is used to calculate the scattering variables [55]: 
 
 
 
Where, ‘b’ is the virtual impedance of the transmission line. These scattering variables (um, us, vm, vs) are 
transferred across the wireless channel instead of the original forces and velocities. The transient error is 
delay dependent whereas, the steady state position tracking e(t) = xm(0)-xs(0) depends on the position 
difference at the start up even without any packet loss.  
 
Fig. 9 Delay comparison with IP camera (25 fps with MPEG compression) and FireWire Camera (33 fps with 
JPEG compression) 
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Nevertheless, the performance of the control loop deteriorates even further with packet losses. The 
position tracking error is defined as e = xm(t-τ)-xs(t), where xm(t-τ) is the delayed master position 
received on the slave side. To ensure stability, we assume that the human operator and the environment 
model are passive systems, bounded by known functions of the master and the slave velocities. All signals 
are assumed to belong to the extended l2e space and xm, xs = 0 for t < 0. For the identification of the 
vehicle model (
1, ss BJ ) between the wheel angular position v  and the motor torque mot , a pseudo 
random binary signal (PRBS) is injected to the steering motor in open loop. As a consequence, the steering 
wheel starts to oscillate with a variable angular speed. Assuming a first order model, the transfer function 
in a closed loop with proportional gain 
k  is given as: 
sJBsT
k
sG
sspmot
v





1
0
1
1
)( 


                        (5) 
Thus, the parameters to identify correspond to 
kTJ ps   and kB 10  . Using the system identification 
toolbox of Matlab, the resulting values for the inertia and the viscosity are sJ = 0.0325 kg.m
2 and 
sB = 
0.072 N.m.rad-1s respectively. 
Fault Scenario: We are considering a medium intensity attack on CRCPS operated over IEEE 802.11b/g 
(WLAN) i.e. a distributed denial of service (DDoS) such that the controllability of the closed loop 
teleoperation is threatened because of the unavailability of the network resources for some specific 
period. It is assumed that the attacker is able to breach the security and is capable to add multiple 
network traffic flows thus congesting the wireless network. This results in significant if not complete loss 
of command data from the operator’s station. The attack pattern severely affects the QoS and 
consequently the QoC of the teleoperator.   
 
Fig. 10 Fuzzy Packet rate surface with varying QoSc and QoSv 
Prototyping and results: Dual cameras and compression schemes were compared in an effort to reduce 
the video feedback delay as much as possible. As shown in Fig. 9, the IP-camera with 25 frames per 
second (fps) is found to give an end-to-end delay of 120-160 ms inclusive of communication retard; 
whereas, the Firewire camera is found to provide a delay around 90 ms with JPEG compression while 
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using the same rest of the hardware as in the first scenario. In a saturated network, keeping frame rate 
constant if we increase packet rate, it will increase the delay. So, it is important to see the relationship 
between the driver performance and packet rate and always find the global minimum on this curve. We 
designed a fuzzy controller for ensuring the quality of service of video flow (QoSv) as well as the control 
flow (QoSc) by varying the packet rate of the video as a controlling parameter in our teleoperation 
application. Neuro-fuzzy approaches are found popular in such applications recently as found in [56, 57]. 
The real-time control algorithm is implemented on the NeCS-Car benchmark located at the Department of 
Control Systems, GIPSA-lab, France. Detailed design steps are discussed in [58]. 
 
Fig. 11 Evolution of tracking performance with changing QoS 
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Fig. 12 Wave variables over network with energy monitoring 
A fuzzy controller is used to real time evaluation of the QoS for control and video flows. Fig. 10 shows a 
3D surface showing the distribution of packet rate w.r.t. the quality of service mapping for video and 
control flows. The variables with subscript ‘m’ and ‘s’ show the master and slave displacement, velocity 
and forces respectively. The errors namely errX, errX and errF depict the errors in these measurements 
when the NeCS car is teleoperated on a zigzag track. The results in Fig. 11 show the tracking performance 
of the teleoperation variables with error signals in position, velocity and force variable. The packet loss 
effect on the system stability is pronounced in terms of energy injection into the system as it can violate 
the passivity criteria of the control loop. In this energy monitoring strategy, the input wave energy 
)(
2
ku
lk  is sent over the forward path and )(
2
kv
rk  for the backward path of the network. The Same 
data packet is used for the energy data transmission as the one used to exchange the wave variable 
information to minimize the network traffic.  
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Fig. 13 Reconfiguration scenario with varying QoSv and QoSc 
The forward and backward virtual energies are )(, NE fv  and )(, NE bv  respectively which is defined as 
the difference of the consecutive intervals of wave energy input as follows: 
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It is known that keeping both )(, NE fv and )(, NE bv  as non-negative, the passivity condition can be 
satisfied. Energy supervised data reconstruction provides an easy approach to keep the system stabilized 
while selecting between the zeroing and HLS based on the sign of the criteria as shown in Fig. 12 after 
implementing the following criteria. 
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                (8) 
As shown above, the QoS requirements are managed by controlling the QoS of the communication 
network, the benchmark setup still have vulnerabilities e.g. “teardrop”, which is a UDP attack and 
“overlapping fragment” which can bypass the MAC layer to gain access of the victim node [59]. Thus, the 
malicious intruder can carry out a DoS attack by either UDP or TCP flooding to deliberately block the 
communication between the master and slave station which is crucial for the control of the electric 
vehicle. Based on the detection of a simulated DoS attack by adding video flows over the network at 55 s 
and 100 s, the reconfiguration logic deliberately reduces the QoSv to maintain QoSc as much as possible 
as demonstrated in Fig. 13. However, in case, the delay exceeds 500 ms, it is assumed that the fault has 
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developed in a communication failure, thus an emergency stop command is released from the slave 
system to apply immediate braking sequence. This emergency action is independent of the Master 
station. Fig. 14 demonstrates the timing diagram for the real time control of the teleoperator. The 
diagnosis is based on the estimation from the force, velocity and position sensors which results in loss of 
transparence as the QoS deteriorate.  
 
Fig. 14 Timing sequence for emergency stop 
The paper demonstrates a security framework for collaborative CPS based on a two-pronged strategy 
where the impact of this methodology is demonstrated on a teleoperation benchmark (NeCS-Car). 
Previously, a collaborative CPS is only visualized in theoretical perspective and the CPS literature lacks in a 
possible secure mitigation plan with a real industrial perspective. The generalized application framework 
can be easily applied to any other industrial system with higher complexity, thus it is hoped to provide 
enlightened vision and multidirectional future horizons. 
7. Conclusion  
A secure CPS is required in order to protect the costly physical elements. The security of CPS is 
challenged by ever increasing intelligent cyber-attack developed with the target’s structural insight. 
The paper highlighted the fact that the key to the development of an effective mitigation plan for the 
security of CPS requires the knowledge of the structure of cyber-attack and cyber-physical 
interconnection properties of the system. The previous work in this domain covers the intelligent cyber-
attacks on CPS, but the comprehensive mitigation strategies are missing so far. Cyber-security measures 
are mostly limited to cyber layer of the CPS, whereas industrial protection systems are rigid, less 
intelligent and resilient against dynamic disturbances caused by the cyber-attacks. In this context, the 
CRCPS is proposed with the aim to avoid critical life threatening situations for the worker collaborating 
with heavy payload industrial robots. The method in the CRCPS design is the merger of security and safety 
strategies in a single framework. The resulting security framework is also based on a CRCPS structure in 
which the HC is well linked through diverse adaptor technologies with PC and CC.  
One of the important functions of cyber-attack is the reconnaissance of the target physical asset through 
the control or cyber layer that reveals valuable information. The CRCPS’s controllability is affected by the 
attacker’s ability to design a cyber-attack that challenges explicit characteristics directed by functional 
necessities. The extent gained by the attacker depends upon the damage on the cyber layer properties by 
the confidentiality, integrity and availability attacks. We proposed the scalability of cyber-attacks towards 
the system’s physical outcomes as stability disturbance for a short period and reduced sensor efficiency 
poses low to medium level threats. The problem in defining the exact categories of attacks is a difficult 
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estimate, as the threat ability of these attacks is always on the rise due to continuously advancing attack 
algorithms. In that case, an attack considered as a low level may harm the target to a serious effect. A 
security approach or a mitigation plan against cyber-attacks must have robust characteristics. The 
robustness is required specifically for controllability of the CRCPS. As a non-linear system, the 
controllability and observability properties can jeopardize in the case of attacker gain and defender 
loss of the system. The security framework highlighted the risk hotspots and the type of attacks possible. 
It may also lead up to the quantification of risk metrics derived from the scalable extent of the attack. We 
reduced the number of cyber properties and identified authentication, availability, and confidentiality as 
important ones to CRCPS. The paper presented the detailed security requirements of CRCPS before 
proposing a security mitigation plan against cyber-attacks on such systems. 
The paper analyses cyber vulnerabilities in CRCPS and demonstrated cyber-attack impact on different 
elements of a control loop. The elements that can be impacted include sensor measurements, actuator 
signals, controllers and reference signals. The system vulnerability in terms of controllability and security 
attributes show the relevance of SISO and MIMO systems in designing CPS. MIMO systems are preferable 
as decentralized control can perform better for cyber-security. For designing countermeasures in such 
systems, the system must exhibit an attack detection feature. The paper emphasizes on intelligent 
physical parameter check; e.g. side channel attacks in cryptography, to identify whether the system is 
under attack. However, the strategy cannot differentiate the system under attack status from the aging 
effects on a system. To preserve the confidentiality within a CRCPS, the use of an encrypted data bus is 
considered to be useful, as the attacker reads data without a decryption key. This may specifically provide 
a benefit for system security if the physical access to a data port is made. A lightweight demonstration is 
presented over NeCS-Car teleoperation test-bench. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that controlling 
the QoS alone to improve the QoC is not sufficient without securing the intelligent communicating nodes 
of the overall architecture. It is recommended to consider using IP security protocols (IPSec) or its 
improved versions to enhance the security of CRCPS further. In future, we will develop the validated 
design guideline for security framework of the complex multi-degree of freedom collaborative CPS, with 
quantifiable risk analysis and follow a robust approach towards security framework design by dealing with 
the drawbacks of IPSec protocol for CRCPS implementation. 
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